

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State



53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

Control: 15189

Rec'd: November 28, 1960

6:10 p.m.

Action
EUR

Info

FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1311, November 28, 6 p.m.

SS
G
SP
C
L
H
FE
IO
UCEA
P
USIA
MOF
OCB
INT.
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
NIC

PMR

SENT DEPARTMENT 1311, REPEATED INFORMATION BELGRADE 12,
HONG KONG 58.

Reports on meeting Communist parties must be taken with reserve as security tight our chief source [redacted] Latter now almost isolated. [redacted] informed me Khrushchev spoke three times and Liu made long speech attacking Khrushchev before plenary session. In view large numbers involved reliable information should eventually be forthcoming. [redacted] said one issue was Chinese proposal reestablish Comintern-like organization with Soviets opposing. Chinese apparently desire bloc discussion all major policies whereas Soviets have world wide interests re which they insist upon determining their policies unilaterally.

Questioned about reports that CHICOMS had attacked Khrushchev personally at conference last week, [redacted] expressed to Embassy Officer belief reports true. He claimed Peiping before conference had circulated to bloc parties 140-page exposition its position under title "Khrushchev and We." He advanced theory that CHICOMS had hoped be able unseat Khrushchev by focussing criticism on him, but had no idea of whom CHICOMS thought might replace him.

[redacted] reported that when he asked Soviet acquaintance what tactics CHICOMS were pursuing at conference, Russians replied they were acting like Soviets in UNGA, talking frequently and at length.

Yugoslav

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
Agency Case # 470421
NLE Case # 116-174-22
By [redacted] NLE Date 11/2/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

-2- 1311, November 28, 6 p.m. from Moscow

[] states Novotny actually left Moscow November 16 instead of November 19 as announced and that Sihanouk was due arrive there only on 21st. Reported reason early departure was pique at preference shown by Khrushchev for Gomulka.

Regardless outcome this meeting, and it seems clear that Sino-Soviet split will continue, some effects will follow from mere fact of meeting and airing of dispute. Among these may be cited weakening of Khrushchev personally and Soviet leadership generally so far as bloc is concerned. Entire bloc will be conscious of criticism directed at both Soviet policies and methods and Soviets will be to some extent on defensive in future. Presumably Soviets will find it more difficult impose decisions on other bloc members. Khrushchev's need for success will have increased and his ability make compromises on such questions as Berlin will have diminished. Probable also that he will be obliged give more consideration to views his presidium colleagues than in past. Discussion will probably have refurbished revolutionary goals of Communist movement and these will doubtless be uppermost in minds of participants for some time to come.

THOMPSON

LRR/1

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED